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Abstract 
The EU-Turkey Statement was introduced in March 2016 as a solution to the ongoing Syrian 
refugee crisis, with the aim of limiting irregular migration to Europe and securing the EU’s 
external borders. As an act of externalization of the European border and migration control, the 
agreement has been regarded as controversial. This paper attempts to answer how the EU-
Turkey Statement has been framed in the political discourse as an attempt to legitimize the 
externalization of European border and migration management to a ‘safe third country’. The 
research question will be addressed through document and discourse analysis, and with the 
analytical lenses of humanitarianization, securitization and externalization of the Statement, its 
evaluations, and the political discourses surrounding it. In summary, the result of this analysis 
shows that the EU-Turkey Statement has been framed as a humanitarian and security crisis in 
order to justify a questionable externalization policy.   
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As a response to the ongoing Syrian refugee ‘crisis’, the Council of the European Union 
presented a legally non-binding statement that would later be known as the “EU-Turkey Deal”. 
The Statement presented an official plan on how to minimize the number of irregular migrants 
arriving to Europe from Turkey, to limit the deaths at sea, and to break the business model of 
human smugglers, thereby including elements of both humanitarian and security concerns 
(Council of the EU, 2016). In order to do so, the agreement enabled the return of irregular 
migrants to the Turkish mainland and facilitated a cooperation of border control between the 
EU, Greece, Turkey, and NATO in the Aegean Sea. The means to persuade Turkey to cooperate 
included a promise of six billion euros in financial support, visa liberalization for Turkish 
citizens to EU countries, a reopening of the accession talks for Turkey in the EU, and a 
relocation mechanism for Syrian refugees to be resettled amongst EU Member States (Council 
of the EU, 2016). The agreement proved to be controversial due to a number of reasons, such 
as how the negotiation took place, the humanitarian consequences, the diversion of 
humanitarian funding to security measures, the legality of the Statement, and the ways of 
implementing it. Additionally, the Statement received critique for outsourcing border and 
migration control to Turkey (UNHCR, 2016a).   
 
As the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’ dominated the media, the topic became highly politicized and 
received much public and political attention across Europe (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). 
The EU-Turkey Statement was in this context presented as the only durable solution, even 
though it pushed the International Refugee Conventions to the limit and had significant 
humanitarian consequences (Peers, 2016). Henceforth, the relevance of this research is 
twofold; firstly, the implemented policies in relation to the agreement have enormous impact 
on the lives of the people affected, thus making the political justification questionable and the 
legitimatizing narratives misleading. Secondly, externalization as a concept is not a new 
phenomenon, but rather a reoccurring policy already used in other geographical context, thus 
making this analysis complementary to the existing literature. As similar agreements with third 
countries have already been proposed, e.g. between the EU and Egypt, more knowledge on the 
implications of these policies is necessary (European Council of Foreign Relations, 2018).  
 
Our hypothesis is that the EU-Turkey Statement has been framed in a certain way in the 
political discourse in order to justify a policy of externalization. Therefore, we seek to examine 
the following research question: How has the EU-Turkey Statement been framed in the political 
discourse, in order to legitimize the externalization of European border and migration control 
to a third country? In order to analyze the political discourse legitimizing this policy, we must 
first gain an understanding of the factual implications of it.  
 
The Statement on Paper and in Practice: 
In theory, the agreement states that all displaced Syrians intercepted in the Aegean Sea would 
swiftly be sent back to Turkey, while all new arrivals to the Greek islands would have their 
asylum case processed by Greek authorities in collaboration with the UNHCR. All those 
deemed not in need of international protection would be sent back to Turkey, “accordingly to 
the relevant international laws and the non-refoulment principle” (Council of the EU, 2016), 
thereby assuming that Turkey is in fact a ‘safe third country’. However, for every Syrian 
returned to Turkey, another Syrian would on a 1:1 ratio be resettled to an EU Member State, 
accordingly to the UN Vulnerability Criteria (UNHCR, 2016b)  
 
In practice, the agreement has not come close to its original intentions. Only 2.164 Syrians 
have been returned since March 2016, and 12.476 have been resettled from Turkey to the EU 
Member States – a fraction of the approximately 3.6 million displaced Syrians within Turkey 
(European Commission, 2018a; UNHCR, 2018a). The visa liberalization for Turkish citizens 
has not been implemented, while limited progress has been made in regards to Turkey’s 
accession to the European Union (Pierini, 2018). Lastly, only 1.85 billion euros have been paid 
out to various humanitarian projects in Turkey - a considerable difference from the original six 
billion promised by the EU (European Commission, 2018a). While the funding is earmarked 
for humanitarian and development purposes, evidence suggest that parts of it is being spent of 
border control and security, including the purchase of Turkish-produced heavily armored 
vehicles, patrol boats, and surveillance equipment (Ekeberg and Hansen, 2018a; 2018b; 
2018c). The agreement has been successful in terms of drastically reducing the number of 
arrivals to the Greek islands; from 856.723 in 2015 to 29.718 in 2017. Furthermore, the total 
amount of casualties in the Aegean decreased from 799 in 2015 to 54 in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018a).  
 
Although the Statement is presented as a formal agreement between the Council of the 
European Union and Turkey, the document is nothing but a press release, and henceforth, an 
informal agreement at best. Due to the fact that the document is not a treaty or legally binding, 
it is not subject to scrutiny or legal investigation and judgement from the European Court of 
Justice, or any other international legal institution (De Vrieze, 2018, p. 31-41). Additionally, 
because the agreement was made in a press release format, it did not need any approval 
procedure from the European Parliament or national legislations, thus bringing the democratic 
legitimacy of these kinds of informal agreements into question (Peers, 2016). The Council of 
the European Union has thereby successfully sidelined the European Parliament and other 
relevant institutions in the negotiation and decision-making process of the agreement. 
 
We conducted our analysis by looking at the various sources through the analytical lenses of 
humanitarianization, securitization, and externalization. This approach is considered 
appropriate as it is evident that politicians have used narratives based on a combination of 
humanitarian ideals and security concerns to justify particular policy decisions.  
 
Humanitarianism  
For the sake of this paper, humanitarianism will be referenced in relation to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) definition; “Humanitarianism aims at the happiness of 
the human species […], it is the attitude of humanity towards mankind, on a basis of 
universality.” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1979, p. 144). This doctrine is seen 
as anchored within human rights and vows to promote the wellbeing of all humans. While we 
acknowledge humanitarianism as an ideology, we consider humanitarianization as the practice 
of making something into a humanitarian issue. In conducting our document and discourse 
analysis we have identified five main humanitarian arguments; i) avoiding casualties at sea, ii) 
upholding human rights and international law, iii) improving conditions on the ground iv) end 
smuggling operations, and v) provide a safe and legal entry for refugees to Europe. Top 
politicians on both sides of the negotiation table have used these five arguments to legitimize 
the implementation of the Statement and the following consequences. 
 
As European media outlets showed picture upon picture of drowned migrants, an immediate 
demand to stop the casualties was necessary. This media attention emphasized the need to avoid 
migrants drowning in the Aegean Sea as they attempted to reach the Greek islands. Former 
Rotary President of the Council of the European Union, Mark Rutte, emphasized this by stating 
that “There is nothing humanitarian in letting people, families, children, step on boats, being 
tempted by cynical smugglers, and risk their lives,” (Pamuk and Baczynska, 2016a). As another 
example, General Secretary of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, described the situation as “[...] a big, 
big humanitarian tragedy where we all have to respond [...]” (NATO, 2016a).  President of the 
European Council, Donald Tusk, also emphasized the need for solving the ‘crisis’ in a 
humanitarian way “[...] all our actions aimed at solving the problem of refugees, the European 
Union is driven by empathy and the readiness to offer help to those in need, even if the world 
turns its back and pretends not to see.” (BBC, 2016). 
 
As the European Union is based on liberal values and respect for human rights, the need to 
uphold international refugee and human rights law should be considered a central element 
within the European societies. As an example of this, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that 
“[...] we must demonstrate whether we can credibly implement what we always preach: our 
adherence to our values, our humanitarian approach, the protection of human rights.” (The 
Federal Chancellor, 2016a). On another occasion, she claimed that “Europe’s soul is humanity. 
And if we want to keep that soul, if Europe and its values wants to succeed in the world, then 
it must not close itself off.” (BBC, 2018). It may be argued that Merkel’s Christian democratic 
and liberal values reflect through her statements, in recognition of Europe as the fundamental 
protector of human rights.  
 
The EU-Turkey Statement also include aspects of the humanitarian discourse, as it declares 
that “Much progress has been achieved already, including Turkey’s opening of its labour 
market to Syrians under temporary protection [...]” and that the EU “[...] will further speed up 
the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros [...] and ensure funding of further 
projects [...] notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living cost” 
(Council of the EU, 2016). This goes well in hand with statements of politicians such as Jean-
Claude Juncker, Angela Merkel and Donald Tusk who have continuously argued for the 
importance of humanitarian assistance. Although these are just a few examples of the 
humanitarian discourse, it provides a clear understanding of the framing of the crisis and the 
EU-Turkey statement. 
Securitization 
Securitization is a process where a speaker addresses an issue, such as irregular immigration, 
and argues why this should be identified as a security threat towards e.g. a certain society's 
existential identity. It can further be described as a successful non-neutral speech act, which 
the audience has to accept in order to be defined as such. The acceptance gives several political 
advantages, such as the legitimization and justification of extraordinary measures, that 
normally would have been disproportionate and illegal towards the solution of the problem 
(Betts, 2009, p. 71; Neal, 2009, p. 335).  
 
In terms of security, the discourse began as a humanitarian concern regarding displaced people 
drowning at sea but changed relatively quickly to a security concern towards who were entering 
the European Union (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). Ultimately, refugees and migrants on 
route to Europe became part of a discourse in which they were first considered to be at risk, 
while later being understood to be a risk (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015). In relation to this, we 
identified three main security arguments; i) ‘extraordinary measures’ to solve an ‘extraordinary 
situation’, ii) protect Europe’s external borders to save Schengen and European unity and iii) 
counteract the criminal business model of smuggling operations. 
 
First, various politicians have expressed the need to use ‘extraordinary measures’ to solve the 
‘extraordinary situation’, while addressing the immediate migration issue. In an interview 
regarding the Statement, Stoltenberg argued that the involved parties were willing to use the 
“extraordinary measures [...] necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order 
[…]”, including to “welcome the establishment of the NATO activity on the Aegean Sea” 
(BBC, 2016). In order to regain control of the chaotic situation in the Aegean, politicians 
emphasized the need to act urgently, as Rutte expressed that “[...] we cannot cope with this any 
longer, so we have to get a grip on it.” (Soffel, 2016). Further, Rutte stated that “I tend to shy 
away from apocalyptic quotes. But I don’t see how, if we don’t get a deal today or tomorrow, 
we will get a deal at a later stage.” (Reuters, 2016b). By expressing the urgency in solving the 
migration issue, the discourse arguably creates a sense of fear of not being able to solve the 
issue before it is too late. Debatably, Rutte attempts to securitize this issue by convincing the 
audience that the implementation of the Statement is necessary and the most efficient solution 
to the pressing matter. 
 
A second securitization discourse is the need to securitize the external borders. Politicians often 
use this framing to ensure the survival of the Schengen Agreement and hence the free 
movement of people and goods. As stated by President of the European Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker; “The internal market will not survive the refugee crisis if we do not manage 
to secure our external borders jointly [...]” (European Commission, 2016). In this quote, it 
becomes apparent that the EU’s internal market is framed as the referent object at risk, and that 
the irregular migration is the threat. Tusk elaborates on the importance of securing the external 
borders by proclaiming that “We are a territorial community, which means that we have a 
common territory and common external borders. Our duty is to protect them. The migration 
crisis has made us aware, with full force, of the need to rebuild effective control of our external 
borders [...]” (Council of the EU, 2017). This confirms that the EU is framing its ambition to 
protect its external borders as a method to maintain internal stability.  
 
A third key element of the Statement is to break down the smuggling operations in the Aegean 
Sea, as a way to protect the external borders of the European Union (Council of the EU, 2016). 
As the discourse changed from migrants being at risk to later become a risk, or the source of 
threat, smugglers were portrayed to be the means to provide access to Europe. Stoltenberg 
acknowledges this connection by saying “Enabled by criminal gangs, the flow of migrants and 
refugees is putting enormous pressure on the countries affected.” (NATO, 2016b). In relation 
to the Statement, Merkel argued that “This agreement not only helps the refugees, but it is also 
an important contribution towards stopping smuggling and human trafficking, so that the 
external borders can be protected and the reasons for fleeing can be combated.” (The Federal 
Chancellor, 2016b), thereby clearly mixing the discourses of humanitarianization and 
securitization. Interestingly, Merkel is implying that the refugees are fleeing due to human 
trafficking, and not from war and persecution. These quotes frame the Statement as having 
solved the security issues of human smuggling and Schengen, portraying the deal in a positive 
light. Yet it is questioned whether the Statement was ideal, as Rutte comments “in all honesty, 
is the agreement ideal in every respect? No. But was it sorely needed? Absolutely.” 
(Government of the Netherlands, 2016). In this quote it may be implied that the necessity of 
the Statement overruled the potential flaws in the agreement.  
Externalization  
The concept of implementing policies to outsource migration control to an area outside of a 
country’s sovereignty is called externalization. Consequently, a state’s migration control is no 
longer necessarily limited to its geographical territory (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011, p. 16). 
According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, European externalization can be defined as: “[…] the 
multifaceted processes whereby EU member states, or the Union as a supranational actor, 
complement policies to control migration across their territorial borders with initiatives aimed 
at realizing such control outside their territories.” (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2017, p. 40).  
 
A process closely connected to externalization is that of issue-linkage, which involves 
negotiation processes between different parties “[…] where issues like asylum policies are 
linked to other issues, like trade, military, and development policies.” (Lemberg-Pedersen, 
2015, p. 143). In this process, a more powerful country may use its power, being political or 
economic, to export responsibilities to another often less powerful state, who may not always 
have much to say in the matter (Lemberg-Pedersen 2017, p. 40). This means that weaker states 
can be pressured or persuaded to accept foreign border control on their territory by more 
powerful states. Powerful states have the ability to pressure weaker ones into collaboration 
through the conditionality approach. Conditionality entails offering a reward, such as financial 
aid or accession negotiations, in return for the political commitment to fulfill certain conditions 
(Lavenex & Uçarer, 2004, p. 424). By analyzing the discourses surrounding the Statement, it 
became noticeable that politicians tend to avoid the use of this framing. Arguably, 
‘conditionality’ has strong negative connotations of outsourcing responsibilities, which 
discourages politicians from mentioning it explicitly.  
 
One of the ways the EU has convinced Turkey to participate in this agreement, is through issue-
linkage negotiations. In a leaked document from the negotiation of the Statement, Juncker 
articulated that the agreement had to be negotiated as a complete package, which included 
elements such as funding, visa-liberalization, and renewed accession talk to the Union (Pappas, 
2016). The fact that the agreement is a combination of migration, foreign, and economic 
policies shows a clear example of issue-linkage diplomacy. The Statement is explicit about 
this, and explains how “[...] the European Union has begun disbursing the 3 billion euro of the 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey for concrete projects and work has advanced on visa 
liberalization and in the accession talks [...]” (Council of the EU, 2016).  
 
Another way the EU has persuaded Turkey to cooperate is by using the strategy of 
conditionality. The incentives in this case are the above-mentioned funding, visa-liberalization 
and renewed accession talk. However, the EU is debatably withholding parts of the negotiated 
promises, which Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey, is emphasizing by stating that 
"[...] you [the EU] did not fulfill your promises. [...] You never acted honorably, you did not 
act right." (NDTV, 2016). Due to the political development in Turkey after the agreement, and 
especially after the attempted coup, the EU has shown unwillingness to continue accession 
talks and implement visa-liberalization. According to Juncker, Turkey does not meet the EU´s 
requirements regarding the rule of law, justice and fundamental rights (European Commission, 
2017).  
 
Although not explicitly mentioned in the Statement, it may be argued that the agreement is an 
act of externalization. The intent of the Statement is to limit irregular migration, which is 
expressed in the following way: “Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea 
or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU [...]” (Council of the EU, 
2016). The quote both states the aim and one of the means of the agreement; limiting of 
migration is done by stemming routes leading to Europe by giving Turkish authorities the 
responsibility to prevent migrants reaching the EU’s external borders. Another externalization 
measure in the agreement is to return irregular migrants to a third country, namely Turkey. 
According to the Statement, the irregular migrants who reach the Greek islands will be returned 
to Turkey, which is expressed as such; “[...] Turkey, furthermore, agreed to accept the rapid 
return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece 
and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters [...]” (Council of the EU, 
2016).  
 
Thus, it seems clear that the EU-Turkey Statement is an example of a political externalization 
measure. This becomes evident as it is directly stated in the Statement that its aim is to limit or 
manage migration, by transferring migration and border control responsibilities to Turkey.  
Discussion 
We have argued that the EU-Turkey Statement is in fact an externalization policy of European 
migration and border control to Turkey, which has been legitimized by framing the agreement 
in humanitarianization and securitization terms. In order to persuade the audiences about these 
arguments, it is necessary to interpret Turkey as a safe third country. Therefore, we aim to 
question this interpretation by examining the refugee reality in Turkey. According to the EU’s 
Asylum Procedure Directive, a safe third country is defined as: 
 
“A third country that treats a person seeking international protection in accordance with 
the following principles: (a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; (b) 
there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU (Recast 
Qualification Directive) ; (c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the 
Geneva Refugee Convention and Protocol is respected; (d) the prohibition of removal, 
in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and (e) the possibility exists 
to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in 
accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention and Protocol.” (European 
Commission, 2018b). 
 
These criteria, which derive from various instruments of International Human Right Law and 
International Refugee Law, all have to be fulfilled in order to categorize a third country as safe. 
In relation to Turkey, it may be argued that several aspects of this definition are questionable, 
such as the protection of various human rights, breaches of the non-refoulement principle, and 
limitations in the ability to request protection. First, it is important to state that although Turkey 
has ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its amendment, 
the 1967 Protocol, it has maintained the geographical limitation stated in the Convention 
(UNHCR, 2018b). Consequently, Turkey does not recognize non-Europeans as refugees, but 
rather provides displaced people in need of international protection with a ‘temporary 
protective status’. This status provides displaced people in Turkey with “a range of rights, 
services and assistance for beneficiaries of temporary protection. This includes, among others, 
access to health, education, social assistance, psychological support and access to the labour 
market.” (UNHCR, 2018c) However, compared to the refugee status given by the 1951 
Convention, temporary protection does not provide the full benefits and is thus less desirable, 
because Syrians are only granted temporary refuge, thus indicating imminent repatriation. 
 
When discussing whether Turkey is in fact a safe third country, it is necessary to acknowledge 
the recent reports of human right violations. Since the attempted coup d’état in 2016, Turkey 
has increasingly been criticized for breaching a range of human rights, such as freedom of 
movement, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom from torture and other ill 
treatment, as well as abuses by armed groups (Amnesty International, 2018). In relation to the 
Syrians under temporary protective status, Turkey has been accused of not upholding 
international standards, which is illustrated in a report from Amnesty International on human 
rights relating to the Statement, claiming that asylum-seekers and refugees struggle to maintain 
an adequate standard of living (Amnesty International, 2017). Various reports have described 
how Syrian refugees are being exploited in industries such as agriculture and construction, paid 
below minimum wage, sometimes only with food and accommodation (Human Rights Watch, 
2016; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2018). Additionally, rights included in the temporary protective 
status, such as to education, security and health care, are not provided to unregistered refugees 
who crossed the border illegally (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2018). 
 
There have been several claims of forcibly returns of refugees to Syria (Amnesty International, 
2017). Gerry Simpson from the Human Rights Watch affirms this claim and links it to 
refoulement “These are clear-cut unlawful deportations because they are refugees – and 
sending them back amounts to refoulement,” (The Guardian, 2018). In another report, Human 
Rights Watch states that “Turkish security forces have routinely intercepted hundreds, and at 
times thousands, of asylum seekers at the Turkey-Syria border since at least December 2017 
and summarily deported them to the war-ravaged Idlib governorate in Syria” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018).  Clearly, returning refugees to a country where they are at risk of being refouled 
into a warzone, is a direct breach of the non-refoulement principle. It is therefore highly 
questionable whether Turkey can be considered a safe third country. Additionally, as Turkey 
completed the construction of a border wall against Syria in 2017, it has been reported that 
people attempting to cross the border have been shot or pushed back across it (Vammen & 
Lucht, 2017). Witnesses have reported that if captured by Turkish border security, they have 
the options of either be imprisoned indefinitely or sign an asylum waiver and “return 
voluntarily” to Syria. The Turkish government has framed the construction of the wall as a 
security measure against terrorist infiltration from Syria, but it is undoubtedly also a mean to 
prevent further migration to Turkey (Carrié and Asmaa, 2018).  It is important to mention that 
the EU has contributed to the surveillance and security of the wall; according to Die Spiegel, 
the funding provided exceeds 80 million euros (Spiegel, 2018). It may be argued that the border 
wall is a ripple-effect of the Statement and European externalization policies, as Turkey has 
found it necessary to limit the influx of refugees, due to the fact that migration to Europe has 
been contained in Turkey.     
 
According to the above-mentioned examples, we would argue that Turkey cannot in good faith 
be categorized a ‘safe third country’. Due to extensive breach of human rights, refoulement of 
people in need of protection, and limitations in the possibility in applying for asylum, it seems 
evident that the European Union’s interpretation of Turkey as a safe third country does not 






As the 2015 Syrian refugee ‘crisis’ stunned European leaders across the continent, top political 
figures rushed to find a solution that would ensure security and unity within the Union. 
Regardless of well-known human rights violations, lack of legal protection for non-European 
refugees, serious economic concerns and the increasingly autocratic Erdogan-regime, the EU 
chose to interpret Turkey as safe third country - against its own definition. Turkey has been 
persuaded to cooperate through promises of financial aid, visa liberalization, and renewed 
accession talks, however, the EU has withheld several of the rewards, arguably due to Turkey’s 
failure in complying with the conditions set by the EU. As Turkey already has deported 
hundreds of thousands of Syrians back to the war-torn country, a de facto violation of the non-
refoulement principle, Europe has undoubtedly compromised with its core values. The 
Statement has drastically reduced migration through the Eastern Mediterranean route, thereby 
containing Syrians in Turkey. Consequently, the number of displaced people within Turkey 
has increased, causing a ripple effect on the Turkish-Syrian borderscape. As a result, Turkey 
have conducted multiple military operations in northern Syria, establishing ‘safe zones’ as a 
way to deport refugees. Additionally, in order to avoid further migration, Turkey constructed 
a wall on the Turkish-Syrian border, thereby limiting the ability of displaced Syrians to apply 
for protection.  
 
This article has investigated how the EU-Turkey Statement has been framed in the political 
discourse, in order to legitimize the externalization of European border and migration control 
to a ‘safe third country’. The most obvious finding that emerged from this study is how the 
Statement and the discourses surrounding it have been framed in terms of humanitarianization 
and securitization, in order to justify the agreement as an externalization policy. While the 
humanitarian argument represents an extensive part of the discourse, the implementation is 
lacking compared to the emphasis placed on security. This indicates that there is a high degree 
of incoherence between the political narrative of the EU as a liberal organization, and the 
realistic foreign policy strategy adopted towards migration and third countries. It may be 
concluded that EU’s ‘universal principles’ of human rights and humanitarianism in reality ends 
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